There is a great demand from the viewpoint of security insurance to calculate the value of damage due to leakage of personal information. The Japan Network Security Association(JNSA) proposed a model to calculate the damage compensation amount. However, the coefficient was determined by experts' subjective evaluations for which there is no basis. We propose a new mathematical model by applying multiple regression using cyber incident records and information such as enterprise size as explanatory variables and the value of extraordinary losses to a company as a target variable. We apply the damage model to 15,000 cyber incidents, compare the two models' loss amounts, and consider the relationship between them.
INTRODUCTION
There is a great demand from security insurance to estimate the cost due to cyber incidents including compromised sites, data breaches, and leakage of personal information. This growing interest in cyber insurance is reflected in many ways. IT strategy consultancies like Gartner provide guidelines for how to use cyber insurance effectively (Wheeler and Akshay, 2015) . Insurance industry forecasts predict expected growth in premiums from around 2 billion USD in 2015 to some 20 billion USD or more by 2025 (Wells and Jones, 2016) . National governments like the British are supporting the growth of the cyber insurance market to improve cyber security risk management (Cab-inetOffice, 2014 ). Franke reported a characterization of the cyber insurance market in Sweden from the result of interview (Franke, 2017) .
In 2002, the Japan Network Security Association(JNSA) proposed a model for a cost of compensation amount, called the "JO model." The JO model estimates the potential risk of personal information owned by each organization, as well as considering their corporate social responsibility obligations (Japan Network Security Association, 2016 ). The JO model estimates a cost per victim using a multiplication of a number of values; e.g., a fundamental constant being the basic information value of one person of 500 JPY (equivalent to 5 USD), multiplied by a coefficient of three if both name and address are leaked.
However, we point out the following problems in the JO model.
1. The constants such as 500 JPY and coefficients are determined heuristically by a number of experts' experience. Therefore, there is no scientific analysis based on the statistics.
2. It is an old model, designed 16 years ago. Although circumstances such as recent regulation have changed, no revisions have been made so far.
3. The accuracy of the estimated predicted cost is unknown.
A previous study by Romanosky formulated a linear model based on 10,000 cyber incidents in the United States (Romanosky, 2016) . This model uses Advicen's incident dataset but is limited to the United States context. For example, the cost in the Romanosky model depends on lawsuits, which are not common in other countries, such as Japan.
In order to address the above drawbacks of the JO model, we analyze the data from 15,000 cyber incidents covering 12 years from 2005 through 2016 and attempt to formulate a mathematical model of the total loss more accurately.
Instead of Advicen's dataset, we focused on public financial information that companies disclose periodically(QUICK.Corp., ). When a large-scale leakage incident occurs, a company must disclose the cost of dealing with the incident as an extraordinary loss in its annual financial report. From this, we can estimate the cost of incident handling accurately.
In this paper, we propose a new mathematical model obtained by applying multiple regression to the reported leaks of personal information and enterprise statistics; e.g., revenue, number of employees, and extraordinary loss. We apply the proposed model to our database of 15,000 cyber incidents in Japan and report on the accuracy of the model. We also compare our model with the JO model and clarify the relationship between them.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review some related studies including the JO model. After we define the proposed model mathematically in Section 3, we evaluate its accuracy in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss our results, and we conclude the work in Section 6.
PREVIOUS STUDIES

The JO Model
The JNSA Security Damage Investigation Working Group collected public information of cyber incidents reported in newspapers, Internet news, and documents related to incidents published by organizations since 2002. They classified incidents by the type of business of the organizations, the number of customers, the leakage source, and the number of records compromised in the incident. The JNSA dataset consists of attributes including "date," "information management and holding officer," "industry type," "social contribution degree," "number of victims," "classified leakage information," "incident cause," "leakage route," "incident handling quality," and "kinds of information leaked (Name, address, phone number, or, date of birth)." Table 1 shows the statistics of cyber incidents occurring in Japan from 2005 through 2016.
The JNSA Damage Operation Model for Personal Information Leakage (JO model) calculates the cost to each company from these information leakages (Japan Network Security Association, 2016) as follows.
where constant is 500 JPY (equivalent to 5 USD), and sensitivity is defined with the features of compromised personal information as sensitivity = max(10 max(x)−1 + 5 max(y)−1 ) where x is a set of constants that are specified by the mental impact on the individual who suffers the data breach, and y is a set of constants defined by the financial impact of a cyber incident. The range of x and y is {1,2,3}, and the assignment is predetermined by a common table. responsibility is defined as 2 if the company is large or governmental; 1 otherwise.
identifiability is defined as follows.
if a record contains both name and mailing address , 3 if a record contains name or (address and telephone number), 1 otherwise.
Romanosky's Model
Romanosky proposes a model to estimate the total cost incurred by a company in each year based on 11,705 incident reports of American companies from 2005 to 2014 obtained from Advicen 1 as follows (Romanosky, 2016) .
The values of each coefficient are shown in Table 2 . Variable i, t refers to the data of company i in year t, and "records" shows the number of compromised personal information records. "repeat" and "lawsuit" are Boolean values, and "Firm Type" is a dummy variable, defined as 1 if it is applicable, whether the event is filed in the past, whether it was sued for the incident, whether it is a government agency or a general company, otherwise 0, respectively. However, note that Romanosky's model is a regression expression based on information from companies in the US, and it is not clear whether the same model can be applied to Japanese companies.
Other Studies
In the United States, identity theft resulted in corporate and consumer losses of $56 billion dollars in 2005, with up to 35 percent of known identity thefts caused by corporate data breaches. Romanosky et al. estimated the impact of data breach disclosure laws on identity theft from 2002 to 2009 (Romanosky et al., 2011) . They found that adoption of data breach disclosure laws reduce identity theft caused by data breaches by 6.1 percent, on average.
The odds of a firm being sued are 3.5 times greater when individuals suffer financial harm, but 6 times lower when the firm provides free credit monitoring. Moreover, defendants settle 30 percent more often when plaintiffs allege financial loss, or when faced with a certified class action suit (Romanosky et al., ) .
Gordon proposed a model that determines the optimal amount to invest to protect a given set of information (Gordon and Loeb, 2002 ) (Gordon et al., (Romanosky, 2016) .
Government -1. 
PROPOSED METHOD
Overview
In this study, we use two datasets. One is the financial information for the year in which the personal information leakage incident occurred.
This dataset was purchased from QICK Astra Manager (QUICK.Corp., ).
The other is the JNSA datasets from 2005 to 2016 (Japan Network Security Association, ), which contain the information leakage incident data.
In the JO model, estimated damage costs were calculated for each incident. In our study, on the other hand, we use multiple regression with the extraordinary loss as the dependent variable in the year in which the incident occurred.
Extraordinary Loss
It is not trivial to estimate the exact expense of handling an incident because there are many possible factors involved in the incident handling; e.g., the cost of fixing the vulnerability, the cost of compensation of customers, and the loss of reputation. Hence, we focus on the financial annual report in which temporary losses and extraordinary losses are specified. For example, a Japanese educational company, Benesse Holdings, recorded approximately 26 billion JPY (equivalent to 26 million USD) as the extraordinary loss in 2014, when a well-known personal information leakage incident occurred (Benesse Holdings,Inc., 2014) . The amount of money can be considered to be the total cost of handling the incident. We found that similar extraordinary losses were reported by other companies just after their database was compromised. Therefore, in our study, we take the value of the extraordinary loss for each company to be the cost of the incident.
Our Data
The extraordinary loss is the amount of damage recorded for the incident. However, the whole extraordinary loss is not necessarily generated by the incident. For example, the extraordinary loss may include "loss due to discontinuation of system development" or "business structure improvement expenses." Therefore, we need to process the details of the extraordinary loss and the JNSA dataset before applying multiple regression to our model.
Aggregating Statistics by Year
A company sometimes is compromised multiple times in the same year. For example, CyberAgent Inc. had illegal login incidents twice, on May 11, 2016 and November 29, 2016 . In this case, we aggregate statistics for two incidents per year as follows. 
Investigation of Annual Report
We surveyed the annual reports of the top 105 incidents chosen according to the number of victims. Ta- ble 3 shows the statistics to be investigated. As a result of the survey, we show five reports in Table 4 describing "information security countermeasures" as a breakdown of extraordinary loss. 2 We show the costs of information security countermeasures in conjunction with the extraordinary loss in Table 4 . Under the assumption that these information security countermeasures were taken as true losses, we perform single regression and have a simple model of loss by incident.
Loss by incident = 0.849 · extraordinary loss
As shown in Table 4 , the error between information security countermeasure (true value) and the loss by incident (estimate) is 10.87 million JPY on average. The 95% confidence interval is [−18.37 million JPY, +40.11 million JPY].
Exclusion of Unprecedented Data
Extraordinary loss also is affected by events in financial markets or disasters that affect the economy. For example, the Lehman shock that occurred in 2008 resulted in many companies suffering greatly increased extraordinary losses around that time. In order to eliminate the influence of such events, we exclude data before 2010. Similarly, we exclude banks from our dataset because they report these extraordinary losses in a quite different way. There are some institutions that we exclude from our analysis. 3
The Linear Multiple Regression Model
After preprocessing the above data, we are left with 144 records. A summary of the targeted dataset is shown in Table 5 . For the 144 records, we propose the following linear model obtained by applying multiple regression with loss by incident as the objective 2 Seki Co. Ltd. reported that it is liable to pay compensation for an information leakage incident, such as, "On September 15 last year, we announced 'Apology and Notice about the leakage of our customer information.' For the subsequent secondary damage, we have not reported at the moment. There is concern that personal information leaked to the outside due to unauthorized access from the outside, and the correspondence cost related to them, is recorded as an information security countermeasure fee." (Seki, ) 3 The Japan Pension Organization and Japan Post have no corporation ID in the dataset. 
where coefficients of the explanatory variable are shown Table 6 . We indicate * for p < 0.1 (significance level10%), ** for p < 0.05 (significance level 5%), and *** for p < 0.01 (significance level 1%). In the proposed model, we find that the most significant variable (***) is revenue. That is, our estimated loss from an incident strongly depends on revenue (β 2 ). We observed that some large industries such as the construction industry are dominant in loss caused by incident. We also note that a small number of companies are targeted for incidents.
We used the lm function of R for multiple regression. Figure 1 shows the scatter plot between revenue and loss by incident, and the proposed regression model. In the plot, we assigned the mean values for variables x 1 , x 3 , · · · except for revenue x 2 .
EVALUATION
Our Model and Incidents
The scatter plot of loss by incident y with respect to the number of victims (customer) x 1 is shown in Fig. 2 . Similarly, we assigned the mean for variables x 2 , x 3 , · · · except for the number of victims x 1 . Unfortunately, we find in Figure 1 that our model does not fit well.
We show the relationship between our model, the JO model, and Romanosky's model of loss by incident in terms of the number of victims x 1 in Fig. 3 . For the JO model, the cost is proportional to the number of victims, and the influence is significant. However, in the proposed model and Romanosky's model, the estimated cost is less sensitive to the number of victims. Alternative variables might be more significant for incident cost in either model.
Comparison with the JO Model
The JO model of Equation (1) is multiplicative, with some constants according to the per capita compensation for leaked information. On the other hand, our proposed model (Equation (4)) is a linear expression, and the two models seem to be inconsistent. However, we show that these models are equivalent by trans-forming our proposed model as follows.
loss = e f (x) = e β 0 +β 1 ·log(x 1 )+β 2 ·log(x 2 )+β 3 ·x 1 +β 4 ·x 2 +··· = e β 0 · e β 1 ·log(x 1 ) · e β 2 ·log(x 2 ) · e β 3 ·x 1 · · · · = e β 0 · x β 1 1 · x β 2 2 · e β 3 ·x 3 · · · · (4) Table 8 compares coefficients between the our proposed model and the JO model. We find that both models are of multiplicative form with some difference in coefficients.
We show the estimated loss in the three models for 20 major incidents in Table 7 . In the proposed model and the JO model, there was a large difference in the estimated loss, with the average calculated by the JO model being 11,686.5 million JPY. The average error rate for the loss by incident in the proposed model is 1.73. This error is the smallest of the three models.
Let us consider the validity of this constant in the proposed model. In the JO model, the cost was multiplied by a constant, such as 10 times and 5 times depending on the stage, for financial impact, mental impact, and the degree of individual identification. For example, the degree of individual identification x 7 = 1 to the loss amount of x 7 = 3 is estimated as follows.
f (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x 7 = 3, · · · ) f (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x 7 = 1, · · · ) = e β 0 · x β 1 1 · x β 2 2 · · · · e 3β 7 · · · e β 0 · x β 1 1 · x β 2 2 · · · · e 1β 7 · · · = e 3β 7 e 1β 7 = e 2β 7 = 1.5158 < 3
That is, the JO model tripled the cost, which is too expensive in the context of the current financial situation. The JO model estimates 1.5 times higher than actual loss. We estimate the increase in loss when the financial impact x 7 rises by one step in our model and show the results in Table 8 for each stage.
For any variable in the proposed model, the increase is smaller than that of the JO model. Based on data for incidents with financial impact, mental impact, and identifiability all being 1, we estimate the constant value per person in Table 9 . When the financial impact, mental impact, and identifiability are all 1, the loss per person in the JO model is 500 JPY from the Equation (1) but is 212,106.1 JPY in the proposed model. 
Comparison with Romanosky's Model
For the incident data used for regression, the results of each of Romanosky model and the proposed model are shown in Table 7 . We omitted variables lawsuit i,t , FirmType i,t , λ t , ρ ind , andµ i,t because these costs are not relevant in Japan. In the Romanosky model, the average estimated loss is 107.4 million JPY, which is very small.
DISCUSSION
The comparison of the value calculated for the JO model shows that the estimates are quite different. Let us focus on the estimated loss per particular incident for Benesse Holdings in Table 7 . In the JO model, the error rate of loss by incident is 6154.1, but in the proposed model, it is 0.49, and the error for this latter model is very small. The per capita cost divided by the number of victims is 33,000 JPY in the JO model, while it is about 273 JPY in the proposed model. Looking at the average per capita loss by incident from Table 9 , attention must be paid to the fact that the capital loss estimated by our proposed model is very large. We found that our model depends greatly on the revenue of the company, so it might not be suitable for the estimation of cases where the company revenue is large but the number of victims is small. On the other hand, from Table 7 , clearly, the cost estimates in Romanosky's model were smaller than that in our proposed model. The estimate of revenue in our model is 0.9904(β 1 ), which is about seven times higher than Romanosky's model(β 1 = 0.133). In the data used for Romanosky's regression, the average revenue is 8031 million USD. Note that, β 2 (about #customer) is about one-eight Romanosky's model(our model: 0.0379, Romanosky's model: 0.294). We claim that it is caused by the difference in the frequency of litigation between the US and Japan. In Japan, it is rare to pay a large amount of compensation by trial. Instead, it is common just by paying a small amount of apology fee to customers. These implies that Romanosky's model is not suitable for the evaluation of Japanese incidents because of the difference in market size and culture between the US and Japan.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we proposed a new mathematical model to estimate the cost of cyber incidents, and we created a model that estimates the value of losses more accurately than either of the previous studies. The weighted average error rate of our proposed model was 1.73. Benesse's per capita damage amounted to 273 JPY, which implies that it is a more realistic model. However, there is a concern that the extraordinary loss as the objective variable may include the influence of the natural disasters and other events that do not relate to breaches of data security. Therefore, we devised a method of collecting data on the value of losses related only to incidents themselves, including, most importantly, information security countermeasures.
